DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 
Application for the Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                BCMR Docket No. 2001-104 
 
 
   

 

 
 

FINAL DECISION 

 
ANDREWS, Deputy Chair: 
 
 
This  proceeding  was  conducted  according  to  the  provisions  of  section  1552  of 
title 10 and section 425 of title 14 of the United States Code.  The BCMR docketed this 
case on July 5, 2001, upon receipt of the applicant’s completed application and military 
records. 
 
 
appointed members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 

This  final  decision,  dated  September  9,  2002,  is  signed  by  the  three  duly 

RELIEF REQUESTED 

 
 
The applicant asked the Board to correct her military record by removing “Per-
sonality  Disorder”  as  the  narrative  reason  for  separation  on  her  discharge  form  (DD 
214) and by upgrading her separation and reenlistment codes.  Her current separation 
code, JFX, indicates that she was involuntarily discharged due to a personality disorder.  
Her  reenlistment  code,  RE-4,  prohibits  her  from  reenlisting.    The  applicant  did  not 
specify what other narrative reason for separation or codes she  wants substituted for 
those on her DD 214.  She also asked the Board to expunge “all incorrect and unsub-
stantiated records and documents.” 
 

APPLICANT’S ALLEGATIONS 

 
 
The applicant alleged that she was initially quite successful in the Coast Guard.  
During boot camp, she was made company yeoman and had to keep track of 80 other 
trainees.  She also qualified as a marksman.  
 

 
The  applicant  alleged  that  one  Friday  night,  about  two  months  after  she  com-
pleted boot camp and reported to her first duty station, she was visiting in a friend’s 
room, when X, a member whom she had never met before, began threatening suicide, 
“burst into a rage,” and assaulted her friend and another member in the room.  She ran 
out to find help, but X ran after her and screamed “I am going to kill you, [expletive 
deleted], you are going to die!”  She finally found help and, although “shaken by [X’s] 
threats,”  thought  she  “would  be  okay.”    The  next  morning,  she  was  asked  to  give  a 
factual account of the incident to an Intelligence Officer. 
 
 
The applicant alleged that a week later, four members were at her apartment off-
post, when one of them, Y, began yelling and punching her and the two others.  She 
alleged that she had done nothing to provoke the assault but was struck in the face so 
hard that she “suffered a black eye and a facial bone fracture.”1  
 
 
The  applicant  alleged  that  about  two  weeks  after  the  second  assault,  she  was 
called to the office and presented with information concerning her rights.  She checked 
a  box  indicating  that  she  wanted  to  consult  a  lawyer  and  signed  it.    However,  the 
investigator  asked  her  why  she  wanted  to  consult  a  lawyer,  told  her  he  already  had 
three others’ statements, and encouraged her to make a statement.  She “continued to 
ask for a lawyer.”  He then stated, “between you and me was there drinking involved?”  
When  she  responded  “Yes,  but  …”  he  interrupted  her  and  said  “You  just  gave  your 
statement.”    She  told  him  he  had  tricked  her  and  said  she  would  not  speak  again 
without  consulting  a  lawyer.    He  left  for  about  15  minutes  but  then  returned  and 
“continued  to  interrogate  and  to  accuse  me.”    He  told  her  that  if  she  had  not  drunk 
three beers, the assault would not have happened and that she should choose different 
friends.    Once  again,  she  asked  for  a  lawyer.    She  was  sent  to  wait  in  another  office, 
where a chief petty officer came in and asked why she wanted a lawyer.  Thereafter, she 
was sent home and never given the opportunity to speak with a lawyer.  The applicant 
argued that her interrogation should have ended when she asked for an attorney, but it 
continued.  She alleged that she never withdrew her request for or waived her right to 
an attorney.  She alleged that the investigator tried to coerce her into resigning. 
 
 
The  applicant  alleged  that,  even  though  she  was  an  innocent  bystander  and 
became a victim during these incidents, she was charged with violating Articles 134 and 
92 of the UCMJ.  She alleged that her command ostracized her and stopped mentoring 
her and helping her to qualify as a crewman.  She was left behind on distress calls for 
no reason.  The applicant alleged that she asked to be transferred to another unit, but 
her command refused.  She alleged that she was “written up” in two negative adminis-
trative entries (“page 7s”) for small, exaggerated offenses, such as not saluting during 
“colors,” having a cell phone at work, and hanging up on a petty officer.  Regarding the 

                                                 
1  The applicant alleged that although she was x-rayed after the assault, this hairline fracture was not dis-
covered until after her discharge, when the DVA x-rayed it because it remained sore. 

first  allegation,  she  alleged  that  at  her  unit,  everyone—especially  the  supervisors— 
would run inside to avoid saluting during “colors.”  One day, she was outside without 
a cap during flag lowering, so she went into the boathouse and was reported.  Regard-
ing the cell phone, she alleged that her supervisor prepared a page 7 for this alleged 
infraction on the very same day that the command announced that members were not 
allowed to carry cell phones at work, and she did not even have hers with her that day.   
 

Regarding the page 7 for hanging up on a petty officer, the applicant alleged that 
she had  been told to be ready in dress uniform at 9:15 one morning to appear at X’s 
mast as a witness.  At 9:00, because she did not have the proper cap, she called another 
member and asked to borrow her cap.  She alleged that the Officer of the Day (OOD) 
quickly contacted her and said “Did you ask me if you could get ready to go?”  The 
applicant replied that  she had  not yet started changing, was still in “working blues,” 
but had to be in dress uniform by 9:15.  When the OOD did not respond, the applicant 
thought that she had hung up the phone, so the applicant hung up.  She alleged that she 
initially refused to sign the page 7s regarding these incidents because she did not agree 
with them, but the OOD and another third class petty officer insisted, so she did.  The 
applicant alleged that although she tried to straighten out these misunderstandings, she 
still “felt hostility from [the OOD] as well as the majority of my duty station.” 

 
 
The applicant alleged that in addition to requesting an attorney, she also sought 
counseling.  She had been experiencing a lot of insomnia since the assaults.  The sleep-
ing aids she was prescribed made her feel worse, so she stopped taking them.  How-
ever, after disclosing confidential information, she learned that her counselor was pro-
viding that information to the Coast Guard’s investigators.  She alleged that her coun-
selor  was,  de  facto,  an  investigatory  agent  for  the  Coast  Guard.    Therefore,  she  was 
denied “her right to immunity from self-incrimination,” as well as her right to due proc-
ess and her right to counsel.  
 
 
The applicant alleged that in June, after continuing ostracism by her command, 
she gave up and asked to be discharged.  No one encouraged her to stay, and her com-
mand sent her for a psychological evaluation.  She alleged that the results of that evalu-
ation were false and exaggerated.  Moreover, she alleged that although the psycholo-
gist’s  report  stated  that  she  should  not  be  underway,  handle  weapons,  drive  govern-
ment vehicles, or do field work, her command continued to require her to do most of 
these  things,  including  driving  the  launch  boat  for  eleven-hour  shifts,  three  days  a 
week.  She alleged that she was required to perform this duty even after she sprained 
her ankle and was found unfit for sea duty. 
 
 
The applicant alleged that when she received her discharge orders, she saw that 
she  was  to  be  discharged  for  a  “personality  disorder.”    She  alleged  that  she  showed 
them to her counselor, who said that she “clearly did not have any type of personality 
disorder.”  

 
 
The applicant alleged that the purported reason for her discharge, “personality 
disorder,” is false.  She alleged that before her discharge, she was never properly exam-
ined or tested by a psychologist or psychiatrist.  She alleged that  after her discharge, 
when she explained the circumstances to a Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) coun-
selor, he said, “I see this [discharge for personality disorder] on a lot of women’s DD 
214s when they’ve been battered in the military.”  Another DVA counselor told her that 
personality disorder tests should never be conducted during a traumatic experience and 
arranged for her to be tested.  She alleged that the tests showed that she did not have a 
personality disorder. 
 

SUMMARY OF THE RECORD 

 

During her pre-enlistment physical examination in November 199x, the applicant 
admitted that she had been treated for depression in high school after she was attacked 
by two boys with knives who tried to rape her.  The Coast Guard sought and received a 
report from her counselor, dated December 2, 199x, which states that the applicant had 
been treated for anxiety after the attack but was now “well adjusted, stable, and com-
petent.”  Therefore, she was found fit for enlistment and enlisted in the Coast Guard 
Reserve under the delayed entry program on December 15, 199x. 

 
On January 19, 199x, at age 18, the applicant enlisted in the regular Coast Guard 
for four years.  She attended boot camp and reported to her first duty station in xxxxx, 
xxxxxxx on March 12, 199x.  On May 19, 199x, the applicant’s supervisor brought her to 
the health clinic because she had “flipped out.”  The applicant reported that she had felt 
stressed and been unable to sleep since witnessing a fight the week before.  She com-
plained  of  feeling  threatened,  nauseous,  tired,  afraid,  depressed,  and  helpless.    She 
stated that the fight had brought back feelings from when she was almost raped, but her 
command had a “get over it” attitude.  She was diagnosed with “adjustment disorder 
with mixed anxiety and depressed mood”2 and referred for counseling. 

 
On  the  night  of  May  21,  199x,  the  applicant  had  several  members  over  at  her 
apartment.  One of the members assaulted three others, including the applicant.  Shortly 
after midnight on May 22, 199x, she was treated at a hospital.  She reported that she had 
been hit in the right eye with a fist.  The area around her eye was swollen and tender.  
She was x-rayed, but no fractures were found. 

                                                 
2  Adjustment disorders are psychological responses to identifiable stressors that result in the develop-
ment  of  clinically  significant  emotional  or  behavioral  symptoms.    Adjustment  disorders  must  resolve 
within  six  months  of  the  termination  of  the  stressor  but  may  persist  if  the  stressor  is  chronic  or  has 
enduring  consequences.  Adjustment  disorders  are  not  personality  disorders.    American  Psychiatric 
Association,  DIAGNOSTIC  AND  STATISTICAL  MANUAL  OF  MENTAL  DISORDERS,  FOURTH  EDITION,  TEXT 
REVISION (2000) (DSM-IV-TR), p. 679.  Adjustment disorders are not considered personality disorders or 
physical disabilities by the Coast Guard or the DVA. 

 
From  May  24  to  June  14,  199x,  the  applicant  regularly  went  to  the  clinic  com-
plaining of insomnia, fatigue, depression, and anxiety.  The staff reported once that she 
said she  wanted to leave the service, but another time that she wanted to stay in the 
Coast Guard even though she felt persecuted at her duty station.  Dr. X diagnosed her 
with an “adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood.”  

 
On May 26, 199x, the applicant was informed that as a result of the incident on 
May 21st, she had been charged with violating Articles 134 and 92 for drunkenness and 
failing to obey an order by drinking alcohol while under age.  She was advised of her 
rights and signed a paper stating that she wanted to consult a lawyer and would not 
make a statement. 

 
On  June  14,  199x,  the  applicant  went  to  the  clinic  complaining  of  stress  and 
insomnia.  She stated that she was afraid of being attacked again.  Dr. X diagnosed her 
with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as well as the adjustment disorder.  

 
On  June  16,  199x,  the  applicant  was  examined  by  Dr.  Y,  a  psychologist  in  the 
Naval Reserve.  Dr. Y reported that she had been “referred for evaluation for fitness for 
duty secondary to difficulties adjusting to the USCG.  The nature and purpose of the 
mental  health  evaluation  and  the  limits  of  confidentiality  were  discussed  and  the 
patient consented to the evaluation.”  He reported that the recent assaults “made her 
feel  extremely  uncomfortable  and  brought  back  memories  of  a  previous  assault  in 
which two of her friends attempted to rape her with a deadly weapon, when she was 14 
years old.”  Dr. Y reported that she had insomnia and recurrent dreams and flashbacks 
in which she felt as if she were reliving the experience.  He reported that she “has had 
intense psychological and physical distress at exposure to internal or external cues that 
symbolize  or  resemble  an  aspect  of  the  traumatic  event”  and  that,  since  the  recent 
assaults, she had “had poor appetite, low energy, low self-esteem, and recurrent crying 
spells.  She felt as if she was ‘dying inside’ and could no longer stay in the USCG.”  The 
applicant told the doctor that she had thought about killing herself after the attempted 
rape but had not had such thoughts recently.  He found that she had a “history of insta-
bility in relationships, with chronic feelings of emptiness, and impulsivity” but did not 
state the basis for this finding or state that she complained of these things.  It is not clear 
whether the applicant underwent psychological testing. 

 
Dr.  Y  made  the  following  diagnoses  in  accordance  with  the  Diagnostic  and 

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: 

 
Axis I:  309.0  Adjustment Disorder With Depressive Mood 
 

305.10  Nicotine Dependence 

309.81  Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Chronic, EPTE [existed prior to enlistment][3] 

 
Axis II  301.9  Personality Disorder NOS [not otherwise specified] With Borderline Features[4] 
Axis III None  
Axis IV Stresses: Problems at work and lack of support system 
Axis V  Current GAF [global assessment of functioning]: 64 
 
Dr. Y further reported that the applicant 

is  not  considered  mentally  ill,  but  manifests  a  long-standing  disorder  of  character  and 
behavior,  which  is  of  such  severity  as  to  render  her  unsuitable  for  continued  military 
service.  …    Although  not  currently  considered  suicidal  or  homicidal,  this  member  is 
judged to represent a risk to self or others if retained on active duty, especially in view of 
past suicidal ideation.  She is deemed fit for return to duty for immediate processing for 
administrative  separation,  which  should  be  handled  in  compliance  with  appropriate 
USCG PERSONNEL MANUAL [Article] 12-B-16.  She has less than six months of active 
duty, and therefore an Entry Level Separation (ELS) may be initiated.  It is also recom-
mended that she not have access to any weapon, not operate government vehicles, not 
work with classified materials, and not be involved in fieldwork.  The patient should be 
placed on a non-deployment status. …   

 
 

 

Also on June 16, 199x, the applicant consulted a nurse at the clinic about her dif-
ficulty sleeping and pain in her finger.  She told the nurse that she had agreed to an 
entry level separation. 
 

On June 17, 199x, the applicant’s command entered a page 7 in her record stating 
that, on May 21, 199x, she was “observed drinking alcohol and [was] involved in a con-
frontation with [a] shipmate.”  The event was considered her first “alcohol incident.” 
 

On June 18, 199x, the applicant was seen by Dr. X.  He found that she was still 

depressed and anxious about being attacked but marked her as fit for full duty. 
 

                                                 
3  Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is an anxiety disorder (not a personality disorder) in someone 
who has been exposed to a traumatic event in which the person felt “intense fear, helplessness, or hor-
ror.”  The symptoms include recurrent recollections, dreams, or “flashbacks” of the event, intense distress 
upon  exposure  to  cues  that  resemble  an  aspect  of  the  event,  avoidance  of  stimuli  associated  with  the 
trauma,  insomnia,  and  difficulty  concentrating.  DSM-IV-TR,  pp.  463-68.    PTSD  is  considered  a  ratable 
physical disability by the Coast Guard and the DVA.  Coast Guard Medical Manual, Chap. 5.B.11.b.(4); 38 
C.F.R. § 4.130. 
 
4  Personality disorder NOS is a disorder in which the individual’s “personality pattern meets the general 
criteria  for  Personality  Disorder”  but  does  not  meet  the  criteria  for  any  specific  personality  disorder.”  
The general criteria include an enduring, inflexible pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates 
markedly from the expectations of the individual’s culture and leads to significant distress or impairment 
of social or occupational functioning.  The pattern must be long-standing and “not better accounted for as 
a  manifestation  or  consequence  of  another  mental  disorder.”    DSM-IV-TR,  pp.  685-89.    Personality 
disorders are not considered physical disabilities by the Coast Guard or the DVA. 
 

 
On June 21, 199x, the applicant’s commanding officer sent a message to the Coast 
Guard Personnel Command (CGPC) recommending that she be discharged because of 
her diagnosed personality disorder.  His message to CGPC indicated that the applicant 
had been notified of her pending discharge and had declined to submit a statement on 
her own behalf.5 
 
 
was being discharged. 
 

On June 22, 199x, the charges against the applicant were dismissed because she 

On June 23, 199x, Dr. X completed an SF-502 form in which he quoted much of 
Dr. Y’s findings verbatim.  He noted all of the diagnoses but also reported that she had 
“no  permanent  disqualifying  physical  or  mental  defects  which  are  ratable  under  the 
standard schedule for rating disabilities in current use by the Veterans Administration.” 

On July 9, 199x, the applicant was screened for alcohol abuse.  She was found not 

 
 
On June 25, 199x, the applicant was treated for a right ankle sprain and pain in 
one finger.  She was advised to wrap her ankle and keep a splint on her finger.  Her 
doctor found her fit for full duty “as tolerated” and prescribed Ibuprofen.    
 
 
On June 29, 199x, CGPC ordered the applicant’s command to discharge her no 
later than July 28, 199x, with an honorable discharge by reason of unsuitability under 
Article 12.B.16 of the Personnel Manual.  The order further stated that her separation 
code should be JFX and that the corresponding narrative reason for separation provided 
in the SPD Handbook (“Personality Disorder”) should be assigned. 
 
 
to be an alcohol abuser or to be alcohol dependent. 
 
 
On July 28, 199x, the applicant received an honorable discharge with a separation 
code of JFX, a narrative reason for separation of “Personality Disorder”, and an RE-4 
reenlistment code.   
 
 
On  January  11,  xxxx,  a  “psychology  intern”  and  a  clinical  psychologist  for  the 
DVA signed a report indicating that the applicant continued to experience mild depres-
sion,  anxiety,  and  insomnia  after  her  discharge,  which  “gradually  diminished.”    The 
report states that “[i]t is my professional opinion that [she] does not have a personality 
disorder and is fit to perform the duties required by the United States Navy.”   
 

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 

                                                 
5  The Coast Guard stated that it has searched all pertinent files and could not find the applicant’s “dis-
charge package,” which would contain her command’s letter notifying her of her pending discharge, her 
acknowledgement  of  having  received  the  notification  and  of  her  right  to  submit  a  statement,  and  any 
statement she submitted.  

 
On December 27, 2001, the Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard submitted an advi-
sory opinion recommending that the Board grant partial relief by upgrading the appli-
cant’s reenlistment code to RE-3G, which would allow her to reenlist if she can prove to 
a recruiter that the condition for which she was discharged no longer exists.  However, 
he recommended that the remainder of her DD 214 remain unchanged.  
 

The  Chief  Counsel  alleged  that  the  applicant  “was  properly  diagnosed  with  a 
personality disorder” by a psychologist on June 16, 199x.  Thus, he argued, under Chap-
ter 5.B.2. of the Medical Manual, she was subject to an administrative discharge because 
personality disorders are not physical disabilities and are considered disqualifying for 
military service.  Although Article 12.B.16.h. of the Personnel Manual provides that a 
psychiatrist  “should  be”  consulted  to  make  such  diagnoses  “if  available,”  he  argued 
that the Coast Guard’s use of a psychologist “does not constitute a clear violation of the 
regulation  as  the  language  of  the  regulation  is  permissive  (‘should  be’).”    He  also 
alleged  that,  prior  to  her  enlistment,  she  claimed  never  to  have  suffered  from 
depression or excessive worry. 
 

The Chief Counsel alleged that the Coast Guard followed proper procedures in 
discharging  the  applicant.    Although  the  documentation  has  apparently  been  lost,  he 
alleged that, in accordance with Article 12.B.16.d. of the Personnel Manual, she received 
notice of her command’s recommendation that she be discharged and the opportunity 
to submit a written statement on her own behalf, which she declined. 

 
The Chief Counsel argued that “[a]bsent strong evidence to the contrary, govern-
ment officials are presumed to have carried out their duties correctly, lawfully, and in 
good faith.” Arens v. United States, 969 F.2d 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sanders v. United 
States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl. 1979).  He argued that the applicant has failed to submit 
evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption or even “to allege any due process error 
related  to  her  administrative  discharge.”    Furthermore,  he  argued,  she  has  failed  to 
prove that her discharge amounted to “treatment by military authorities that shocks the 
sense  of  justice.”  See  Sawyer  v.  United  States,  18  Cl.  Ct.  860,  868  (1989),  rev’d  on  other 
grounds, 930 F.2d 1577 (citing Reale v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 1010, 1011 (1976)).  

 
The Chief Counsel alleged that the applicant also failed to prove that her RE-4 
reenlistment code was in error given the psychologist’s finding that her personality dis-
order was long-standing and severe.  However, “based on the information the applicant 
has provided concerning her current mental condition and the absence of the complete 
record  of  the  circumstances  leading  to  her  discharge,  reasonable  doubt  exists 
concerning  the  continued  appropriateness  of  the  assignment  of  the  RE-4  code,”  he 
stated that he would “not object” if the Board upgraded her reenlistment code to RE-3G.   

 
Finally, the Chief Counsel argued that, even if it were true that the applicant’s 
constitutional rights were violated in the investigation of the circumstances surround-

ing the assaults, there is no evidence that any admission she made to the investigator 
improperly  influenced  the  psychologist’s  diagnosis.    Moreover,  while  such  an  admis-
sion, if obtained in violation of her constitutional rights, might be excluded from disci-
plinary proceedings, he argued, the applicant “has failed to state how the exclusionary 
rule for illegally obtained admissions would apply in an administrative setting.”   
 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 
 
On December 28, 2001, the Chairman sent the applicant a copy of the views of 
the Coast Guard and invited her to respond within 15 days.  The applicant requested an 
extension of the time to respond.  Her response was received on March 13, 2002. 
 
 
The  applicant  argued  that  her  discharge  on  the  basis  of  Dr.  Y’s  diagnosis  was 
improper because the Coast Guard failed “to show, or even to allege, that a ‘psychia-
trist’ was not available.”  She argued that a psychiatrist must have been available given 
the location of her unit.  Moreover, she argued, the presumption of her fitness for duty 
must outweigh the presumption of regularity accorded Coast Guard officials. 
 
 
The applicant alleged that the psychologist’s diagnosis was “arbitrary, prejudi-
cial  and  incompetent.”    She  alleged  that  it  was  illogical  for  the  psychologist,  “based 
upon minimal contact” with her,  to “extend his belief to a ‘long standing’ ‘character 
disorder’” and that it was inconsistent for him to find her fit for duty.  She alleged that 
the  Coast  Guard  arbitrarily  ignored  the  fact  that  she  was  initially  diagnosed  with  an 
adjustment disorder rather than a personality disorder.  She argued that the fact that 
her  counselor  did  not  diagnose  her  with  a  personality  disorder  and  the  fact  that  the 
circumstances surrounding her discharge did not justify negative and derogatory codes 
on her DD 214 “cast substantial doubt” on Dr. Y’s diagnosis. 
 
 
The  applicant  alleged  that  the  record  shows  she  was  “denied  due  process  and 
fundamental fairness.”  She alleged that the burden is on the Coast Guard to provide 
the Board with all her military records, and it failed to do so.  The applicant alleged that 
she was denied counsel regarding her pending discharge.  She argued that because the 
“discharge package” is missing, the Board must presume that the records, notices, and 
waivers  never  existed.    She  repeated  her  allegations  about  not  being  allowed  by  the 
investigator to consult an attorney and alleged that that denial of due process consti-
tutes “treatment by military authorities that shocks the sense of justice.” 
 

APPLICANT’S FURTHER RESPONSE 

 
 
On July 3, 2002, the Board met to consider the applicant’s request.  The Board 
determined that because of her diagnosed PTSD, the applicant was erroneously denied 
evaluation by a medical board under the Physical Disability Evaluation System.  In cor-
recting a record, the Board normally tries to put an applicant in the position she would 

have  been  in  had  the  Coast  Guard  not  erred.    Therefore,  the  Board  decided  that  the 
applicant was entitled to be discharged under the PDES.  However, because she had not 
expressly  requested  medical  board  processing  and,  under  certain  circumstances,  a 
physical disability separation might be considered adverse by a veteran, the applicant 
was asked whether she would consider such relief to be in her favor.  The Board is only 
authorized to correct a record in an applicant’s favor.  Doyle v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 
285 (1979), amended on other grounds, 220 Ct. Cl. 326, cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982. 
 
 
On August 21, 2002, the applicant responded to the inquiry.  She stated that a 
“finding of a post traumatic stress disorder is less offensive … and [I] accept the fact 
that it is more consistent with the record than the entirely inaccurate finding of a per-
sonality disorder.”  She alleged, however, that her stress in May and June 199x resulted 
as much from the “threatening investigatory methods” of the Coast Guard as from her 
involvement in the two assaults.  Moreover, she argued that a finding that she had a 
disorder when she was released “would be speculative and irreparably tainted because 
of the Coast Guard's error in failing to provide timely and appropriate medical exam-
ination and evaluation prior to her discharge.”  
 

The applicant indicated that she is not interested in receiving a discharge by rea-
son  of  physical  disability  because  her  primary  goal  is  to  enlist  in  the  Reserve.    She 
argued that justice would be better served by assigning her an RE-1 reenlistment code 
than an RE-3 code (which she would get with a physical disability discharge) or the RE-
4 code she now has. 
 

Provisions of the Coast Guard Personnel Manual 
 
 
Under  Article  12.B.6., before  being  discharged,  every  member  must  be  given  a 
complete physical examination in accordance with the Medical Manual.  The member 
must  be  given  a  copy  of  the  examination  report  and  sign  another  form  to  indicate 
whether she agrees or disagrees with the findings.  Article 12.B.6.b.  If the member dis-
agrees with the findings, the report and the member’s statement objecting to the find-
ings  are  forwarded  to  CGPC  for  review,  and  the  member  may  be  retained  on  active 
duty until the review is complete.  Article 12.B.6.c.  
 
 
Under Article 12.B.6.d.3., if the physical examination indicates that the member 
has a permanent, disqualifying physical or mental impairment, an Initial Medical Board 
(IMB) must be convened and the member must be retained in service until processing 
under the Physical Disability Evaluation System (PDES) is complete.   
 
 
 Article  12.B.16.  of  the  Personnel  Manual  (PM)  authorizes  the  Commandant  to 
discharge enlisted personnel for unsuitability if they have been diagnosed with one of 

APPLICABLE REGULATIONS 

 

the “personality behavior disorders …  listed in Chapter 5, CG Medical Manual … .”  
Under Article 12.B.16.d., a member being recommended for such a discharge is entitled 
to notification and may submit a statement on her own behalf.  She must acknowledge 
notification by signing an administrative entry for her military record.  She is only enti-
tled to an attorney if a less than honorable discharge is being considered. 
 

Article 12.B.16.h. provides that if a member is under consideration for an unsuit-
ability  discharge  and  a  psychiatric  condition  is  involved,  the  member  “should  be” 
examined by “a psychiatrist, if available.”  The medical officer’s report, an SF-502 form, 
should  include  a  narrative  summary  describing  the  essential  points  of  the  member's 
mental  and  physical  condition;  a  statement  that  no  disqualifying  mental  or  physical 
defects  exist  which  are  ratable  as  a  disability  under  the  Veterans'  Administration 
Schedule  for  Rating  Disabilities;  and  a  statement  whether  the  individual  was  and  is 
mentally capable both to distinguish right from wrong and adhere to the right and has 
the  mental  capacity  to  understand  the  action  being  contemplated  in  his  or  her  case.  
Article 12.B.16.h.3. provides that “[i]f it appears a mental or physical disability causes 
the unsuitability, a medical board will be requested.” 
 
  
Article  12.B.16.j.  provides  that  in  every  case  of  discharge  for  unsuitability,  the 
command shall assemble a discharge package including a copy of the letter notifying 
the member of the reason(s) for administrative processing and of her rights; the mem-
ber's signed statement of awareness, statement on her own behalf, or refusal to make a 
statement;  report  of  the  medical  board  or  SF-502,  as  applicable;  and  other  pertinent 
documents. 
 

Under  Article  12.B.16.k.,  a  commanding  officer  may  recommend  a  member’s 
unsuitability discharge “by message,” as opposed to a more extended format, only if the 
member  has  been  diagnosed  with  a  personality  disorder  by  a  psychiatrist  and  if  the 
“member being processed has  fewer than eight years' total active or inactive military 
service, has been notified in writing of the specific action proposed with the reason(s) 
for it, and has indicated in a written statement he or she substantially agrees.”  Article 
12.B.16.k. further provides that “the message format is not appropriate in cases in which 
the member's record does not indicate poor performance or substandard conduct and 
the member's personality disorder has only recently become apparent.” 
 
 
Article 17.B.5. provides that “[i]f an evaluee has both a condition that is not a dis-
ability, and also a ratable disability, the evaluee is entitled to benefits only if the ratable 
disability, considered alone, is determined to render the evaluee not fit for duty.” 

 

Provisions of the Coast Guard Medical Manual 

 
According  to  Chapter  3.B.3.a.(1)  of  the  Medical  Manual,  during  the  medical 
examination a member must undergo prior to separation, “the examiner shall consult 

the appropriate standards of this chapter to determine if any of the defects noted are 
disqualifying for the purpose of the physical examination.”  Chapter 3.F. lists the medi-
cal  conditions  that  “are  normally  disqualifying”  for  military  service.    Persons  with 
“listed conditions or defects (and any other not listed) considered disqualifying shall be 
referred to an Initial Medical Board … .”  However, Chapter 3.F.16. provides that the 
disposition  of  members  with  psychiatric  disorders  is  governed  by  Chapter  5  of  the 
Medical Manual, and Chapter 3.F.16.c provides that personality disorders “may render 
an individual administratively unfit [for duty] rather than unfit because of a physical 
impairment.  Interference with performance of effective duty will be dealt with through 
appropriate administrative channels (see Section 5-B).” 

 
Chapter  5.B.  relies  on  the  diagnostic  categories  of  the  DSM  IV.    Chapter  5.B.2. 
provides  that  personality  disorders,  including  “Personality  Disorder  NOS,”  qualify  a 
member  for  administrative  discharge  pursuant  to  Article  12  of  the  Personnel  Manual 
instead of medical board processing. 

 
Adjustment disorders are listed in Chapter 5.B.3, which states that they “are gen-
erally treatable and not usually grounds for separation.  However, when these condi-
tions  persist  or  treatment  is  likely  to  be  prolonged  or  non-curative  (e.g.  inability  to 
adjust to military life …) process in accordance with [Article 12 of the Personnel Man-
ual] is necessary.”  Chapter 3.F.16.d. states that adjustment disorders are “[t]ransient, 
situational maladjustments due to acute or special stress … .  However, if these condi-
tions are recurrent and interfere with military duty, are not amenable to treatment, or 
require prolonged treatment, administrative separation should be recommended.” 

 
PTSD is listed under Chapter 5.B.11.b. as an anxiety disorder.  It provides that 

members with PTSD “shall be processed in accordance with PDES.” 

 
According  to  Chapter  3.B.6.,  which  is  entitled  “Separation  Not  Appropriate  by 

Reason of Physical Disability,” 
 

[w]hen a member has an impairment (in accordance with section 3-F of this manual) an 
Initial  Medical  Board  shall  be  convened  only  if  the  conditions  listed  in  paragraph  2-C-
2.(b) [of the PDES Manual] are also met.  Otherwise the member is suitable for separa-
tion. 
 
Chapter 4.B.27.c. provides that “[m]embers not already in the physical disability 
evaluation system, who disagree with the assumption of fitness for duty at separation 
shall indicate on the reverse of form CG-4057.”  Chapter 3.B.5. provides that 

 
[a]ny member undergoing separation from the service who disagrees with the assump-
tion of fitness for duty and claims to have a physical disability as defined in section 2-A-
38 of COMDTINST M1850.2 (series), Physical Disability Evaluation System, shall submit 

written objections, within  10 days of  signing the Chronological  Record of Service (CG-
4057), to Commander [CGPC]. . . . 
 
. . . Commander [CGPC] will evaluate each case and, based upon information submitted, 
take one of the following actions: 
 
(1)  find separation appropriate, in which case the individual will be so notified and the 
normal separation process completed; 
 
(2)  find separation inappropriate, in which case the entire record will be returned and 
appropriate action recommended; or 
 
(3)  request additional documentation before making a determination. 

 
Provisions of the PDES Manual 
 
 
The  PDES  Manual  governs  the  separation  or  retirement  of  members  due  to 
physical disability.  Article 2.C.2. of the PDES Manual states the following general poli-
cies: 

 
a.  The  sole  standard  in  making  determinations  of  physical  disability  as  a  basis  for 
retirement or separation shall be unfitness to perform the duties of office, grade, rank or 
rating because of disease or injury incurred or aggravated through military service. 

b. 

 …  The following policies apply: 

•  •  • 

(1)  Continued performance of duty until a member is scheduled for separation 
or retirement for reasons other than physical disability creates a presumption of 
fitness for duty that may be overcome if it is established by a preponderance of 
the evidence that: 

(a)  the member, because of disability, was physically unable to perform 

adequately in his or her assigned duties; or 

(b)  acute, grave illness or injury, or other deterioration of the member’s 
physical condition occurred immediately prior to or coincident with 
processing for separation … .  

•  •  • 

(2)    A  member  being  processed  for  separation  or  retirement  for  reasons  other 
than physical disability shall not be referred for disability evaluation unless the 
condition in paragraphs 2.C.2.b.(1)(a) or (b) are met. 

 
 
Article 3.D.3. provides that an IMB must be initiated for a member upon detec-
tion of a physical impairment preexisting enlistment or appointment in the Coast Guard 
or  “in  any  situation  where  fitness  for  continuation  of  active  duty  is  in  question.”  
Whether  a  disability  actually  preexisted  a  member’s  enlistment  and  whether  it  was 
aggravated  while  the member  served on  active  duty  are  determinations  made  by  the 
medical boards.  See PDES Manual, Articles 2.C.5. and 2.C.6.  

  

SPD Handbook 
 

 
The SPD Handbook provides that members with less than eight years of active 
service who are involuntarily discharged because of a personality disorder receive a JFX 
separation code and either an RE-4 or RE-3G reenlistment code.  There are a variety of 
separation  codes  for  members  discharged  because  of  a  physical  or  mental  disability.  
Those whose disabilities do not result in retirements receive RE-3P reenlistment codes 
so that they may reenlist if they can prove to a recruiter that the condition for which 
they were separated no longer exists.  The following codes and narrative reasons in the 
SPD Handbook were mentioned or could apply in this case: 
 

 

RE Code 
RE-4 or 
RE-3G 

Separation 
Authority 
12.B.16 

SPD 
Code 
JFX 

Narrative Reason 
for Separation 
Personality 
Disorder 

JFL 

JND 

Disability, 
Severance Pay 

Separation for 
Miscellaneous/ 
General Reasons 

RE-3P 

12.B.15 

RE-1 or 
RE-4 

12.B.12 

JFV 

Condition, Not a 
Disability 

RE-4 or 
RE-3G 

12.B.12 

JGA 

Entry Level 
Performance and 
Conduct 

RE-3L 

12.B.20 

 

 
Explanation 
Involuntarily discharge … when a personality disorder 
exists, not amounting to a disability, which potentially 
interferes with assignment to or performance of duty. 
Involuntary discharge … resulting from physical 
disability with entitlement to severance pay—retirement 
not authorized. 
Involuntary discharge … when a Service component 
does not have a Service reporting requirement for 
specific reasons and desires to identify reasons 
collectively [as] “All other reasons” which qualify a 
member for separation. 
Involuntarily discharge … when a condition, not a physi-
cal disability, interferes with the performance of duty 
(Enuresis, motion sickness, allergy, obesity, fear of 
flying, et al.) 
Involuntary discharge … when member has inability, 
lack of effort, failure to adapt to military or minor 
disciplinary infractions during the first 180 days of active 
military service. 

Page 7s and Alcohol Incidents 
 

 

1. 

 
2. 

 
3. 

Commandant  Instruction  1000.14A,  “Preparation  and  Submission  of  Adminis-
trative Remarks (CG-3307),” authorizes COs to prepare negative page 7 entries for the 
military records of members who commit acts that are contrary to Coast Guard rules 
and policies.  It is not necessary for a member to be found guilty of an offense at mast or 
court-martial for a CO to prepare a page 7 describing the proscribed acts. 
 
 
Article  20  of  the  Personnel  Manual  contains  the  regulations  regarding  alcohol 
abuse by Coast Guard members.  Article 20.B.2.g. states that “[t]he first time a member 
is involved in an alcohol incident, ... the commanding officer shall ensure this counsel-
ing is conducted; for enlisted members recorded on a [page 7] entry in the member's 
PDR ... .”  Under Article 20.A.2.d., an “alcohol incident” is defined as  
 

Any behavior in which the use or abuse of alcohol is determined to be a significant or 
causative  factor  and  which  results  in  the  member's  loss  of  ability  to  perform  assigned 
duties,  brings  discredit  upon  the  Uniformed  Services,  or  is  a  violation  of  the  Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or federal, state, or local laws. The member need not be 
found guilty at court martial, in a civilian court, or be awarded non-judicial punishment 
(NJP) for the behavior to be considered an alcohol incident. However, the member must 
actually consume alcohol for an alcohol incident to have occurred. 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

 
 
The  Board  makes  the  following  findings  and  conclusions  on  the  basis  of  the 
applicant's military record and submissions, the Coast Guard's submissions, and appli-
cable law: 
 

The  Board  has  jurisdiction  concerning  this  matter  pursuant  to  10  U.S.C. 

§ 1552.  The application was timely. 

The applicant requested an oral hearing before the Board.  The Chair, act-
ing pursuant to 33 C.F.R. § 52.31, denied the request and recommended disposition of 
the case without a hearing.  The Board concurs in that recommendation. 

The record shows that prior to her discharge, the applicant was diagnosed 
by both her primary doctor and a psychologist with PTSD, which was interfering with 
her performance of duty.  PTSD is considered a ratable disability by both the DVA and 
the Coast Guard.  38 C.F.R. § 4.130; Medical Manual, Chap. 5.B.11.b.(4).  Anomalously, 
however,  her  doctor  ignored  the  diagnosis  and  reported  that  she  had  no  ratable  dis-
ability. 
 
4. 

Under Article 12.B.6.d.3. of the Personnel Manual, Chapter 5.B.11.b. of the 
Medical Manual, and Article 3.D.3. of the PDES Manual, the applicant was entitled to 

evaluation by a medical board and PDES processing because of her PTSD.  This is true 
even  though  her  condition  may  have  existed  prior  to  her  enlistment.    PDES  Manual, 
Article  3.D.3.    Whether  she  incurred  PTSD  before  she  enlisted  and  whether  it  was 
aggravated while she served on active duty were determinations to be made by medical 
boards,  not  by  her  individual  doctors.    PDES  Manual,  Articles  2.C.5.  and  2.C.6.    The 
Board finds that the Coast Guard erred in not processing the applicant under the PDES. 

The record shows that the applicant admitted to the Coast Guard during 
her  pre-enlistment  physical  examination  that  she  had  previously  been  attacked  and 
received  counseling.    The  Coast  Guard  chose  to  enlist  her  anyway  after  receiving  a 
report from her counselor.  The Board finds that the applicant committed no fraud in 
this respect. 

The Board finds that, in accordance with Article 12.B.16.h.3. of the Person-
nel Manual and Chapter 5.B.11.b. of the Medical Manual, the applicant was entitled to 
PDES processing even though she was diagnosed with an unspecified personality dis-
order soon after she was first diagnosed with PTSD.  Despite her doctor’s finding that 
she was fit for duty, and despite the fact that she continued to perform her duty, the 
Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence in the medical record indicates that, 
in the spring of 199x, the applicant’s chronic PTSD called into question her fitness for 
continuation on active duty.  PDES Manual, Article 3.D.3.  The existence of a disqualify-
ing condition that is not a disability (such as a personality disorder) does not preclude 
processing for a ratable disability (PTSD). See Personnel Manual, Article 17.B.5. 

 
5. 

 
6. 

 
7. 

 
8. 

Because civilian employers often demand to see former servicemembers’ 
DD 214s prior to hiring them, it is extremely important for the information on them to 
be  fair  and  accurate  and  not  unduly  prejudicial.    The  evidence  in  the  record  that the 
applicant suffered from a personality disorder is slim.  She was never diagnosed by a 
psychiatrist, and psychiatrists are not hard to find where she was stationed.  The psy-
chologist’s report was based on a single evaluation session and there is no indication 
that she underwent any specific testing.  While his report contains many details regard-
ing her PTSD symptoms, he wrote only one conclusory sentence with no details to sup-
port  his  diagnosis  of  an  unspecified  personality  disorder.    The  DSM-IV-TR  expressly 
precludes  a  personality  disorder  diagnosis  unless  the  behavior  is  known  to  be  long-
standing  and  “not  better  accounted  for  as  a  manifestation  or  consequence  of  another 
mental disorder.” DSM-IV-TR, p. 689.   

Furthermore, in the Board’s experience, members assigned the separation 
code JFX usually have been diagnosed with a personality disorder or a chronic adjust-
ment disorder that repeatedly leads to inappropriate behavior or misconduct that fully 

supports their diagnoses.6  Moreover, members correctly assigned the JFX code some-
times receive “Unsuitability” as a narrative reason for separation even though the SPD 
Handbook  permits  only  the  use  of  the  phrase  “Personality  Disorder”  with  the  JFX 
code.7  In the instant case, the only evidence of inappropriate behavior or misconduct is 
a single instance of drinking beer while underage.  Therefore, the Board finds that the 
narrative reason for separation and JFX separation code on her DD 214 are unjust. 
 

The Board’s finding that the narrative reason for separation on the appli-
cant’s DD 214 is unjust does not mean that she has proved that the diagnosis of “per-
sonality  disorder”  in  the  psychologist’s  report  in  her  medical  record  is  erroneous.  
Although the Coast Guard’s psychologist did not cite examples of her past behavior to 
support this diagnosis, the DVA counselor’s report is no more detailed or convincing 
than his.  The Board finds that she has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the psychologist erred or acted in bad faith in diagnosing her with a personality 
disorder, and without such evidence it will not alter or remove a medical record. 

9. 

 
10. 

The Chief Counsel alleged that proper procedures were followed in dis-
charging the applicant despite the fact that no discharge package with documentation 
of her notification and statement exists.  However, the record indicates that in addition 
to  denying the  applicant  PDES  processing,  the  Coast  Guard  may  have  violated  other 
regulations and denied her important rights with respect to her discharge.  Although 
the command’s June 21, 199x, message to CGPC initiating her discharge indicates that 
she  was  notified  and  declined  to  submit  a  statement,  the  applicant  indicated  in  her 
application that she did not discover she was to be discharged for a personality disorder 
until she received her orders, and her doctor’s official SF-502 report recording the diag-
noses for her record was signed on June 23, 199x, two days after her command sent the 
message.  In fact, the record indicates that the applicant was told that she would receive 
an uncharacterized “entry level” discharge, rather than one for “personality disorder.” 
Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that the applicant was given an opportu-
nity to object to her doctors’ findings, as required under Article 12.B.6. of the Personnel 
Manual  and  Chapter  4.B.27.c.  of  the  Medical  Manual.    Furthermore,  the  applicant’s 

                                                 
6  See, e.g., CGBCMR Docket No. 199x-037 (member frequently exhibiting inappropriate sexual behavior 
over two-year period was twice diagnosed with “adjustment disorder with disturbance of conduct” and 
discharged with JFX code and narrative reason for separation of “Unsuitability”); CGBCMR Docket No. 
199x-099  (member  twice  arrested  for  indecent  exposure  was  diagnosed  with  narcissistic  personality 
disorder  and  discharged  with  a  GFX  code  (“involuntary  discharge  approved  by  recommendation  of  a 
board when a personality disorder exists, not amounting to a disability, which potentially interferes with 
assignment  to  or  performance  of  duty”)  and  a  narrative  reason  for  separation  of  “Unsuitability”; 
CGBCMR  Docket  No.  1997-097  (member  suffering  severe  chronic  depression  was  diagnosed  with 
passive-aggressive  personality  disorder  and  discharged  with  JFX  code  and  narrative  reason  for 
separation of “Unsuitability”). 
 
7  Id.  Although the SPD Handbook was revised in 1994 to remove “Unsuitability” as a proper narrative 
reason for separation, it apparently continues to be used sometimes in lieu of “Personality Disorder.” 

11. 

command clearly erred by using the message format to recommend her discharge since 
she was  never diagnosed by a psychiatrist,  her alleged personality disorder had only 
recently  been  discovered,  and  there  is  no  evidence  that  she  ever  signed  a  statement 
agreeing  to  be  discharged  for  a  personality  disorder.  Personnel  Manual,  Article 
12.B.16.k.  In light of the apparent procedural irregularities in the applicant’s discharge 
and  the  lack  of  evidence  supporting  the  diagnosis  of  personality  disorder,  the  Board 
finds that the applicant has overcome the presumption of regularity and proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the narrative reason for separation and separation 
code on her DD 214 are erroneous and so unjust as to “shock the sense of justice.”8  
 

The  applicant  asked  the  Board  to  upgrade  the  narrative  reason  for  dis-
charge, separation code, and reenlistment code on her DD 214, but she did not specify 
what codes or narrative reason she believes would be correct.  In fashioning relief, the 
Board’s policy is to try to put an applicant in the position she would have been in had 
the Coast Guard not committed any errors or injustices.9  As the Court of Claims held in 
Caddington v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 604, 607 (Ct. Cl. 1959), “the Secretary and his 
boards have an abiding moral sanction to determine insofar as possible, the true nature 
of an alleged injustice and to take steps to grant thorough and fitting relief.”  However, 
the Board normally does not grant relief that has not been requested, either expressly or 
implicitly, by the applicant.  In this case, the applicant is uninterested in receiving the 
PDES processing to which she was entitled, and it is possible that the outcome of such 
processing would not be in her favor.  If PDES processing determined that her PTSD 
pre-existed  and  was  not  aggravated  by  her  military  service,  she  would  receive  no 
benefit and would be saddled with a “disability” that could preclude her employment 
in certain professions.  BCMRs may only correct applicants’ records in their “favor.”10 
Therefore, and because the applicant neither expressly nor implicitly requested a dis-
ability rating or PDES processing, the Board finds that, despite her diagnosed PTSD, it 
is not appropriate in this case to order PDES processing as the outcome might not be in 
her favor. 
 
 
12.  Apart  from  her  PTSD,  the  only  other  certain  diagnosis  the  applicant 
received was an adjustment disorder.  Adjustment disorders are not personality disor-
ders.11  Therefore, and as stated in finding 8, above, it would be inaccurate and unfair 
for her DD 214 to show that she has a personality disorder on the basis of a diagnosed 
adjustment disorder.12  Furthermore, “adjustment disorder” is not a narrative reason for 

                                                 
8 See Sawyer v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 860, 868 (1989), rev’d on other grounds, 930 F.2d 1577 (citing Reale v. 
United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 1010, 1011 (1976)). 
9  See Kimmel v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 579, 589 (1971). 
10 Doyle v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 285, amended on other grounds, 220 Ct. Cl. 326, cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 
(1979). 
11  DSM-IV-TR, p. 679; Coast Guard Medical Manual, Chap. 5.B.3. 
12 See footnote 7; see also CGBCMR Docket Nos. 2001-072, 199x-050; AFBCMR Docket Nos. 99-00678, 98-
03027, 98-01305; BCNR Docket Nos. 1904-99, 9177-97. 

13. 

separation permitted under the SPD Handbook, and the only “entry level” reasons for 
separation listed in the SPD Handbook are derogatory or obviously inapplicable.  
 

To  provide  relief,  the  Board  must  determine  what  narrative  reason  for 
separation other than “personality disorder” is  most accurate, just, and reasonably in 
the applicant’s “favor.”  The possible alternatives listed in the SPD Handbook are lim-
ited.    In  the  past,  the  Board  has  sometimes  upgraded  the  reason  for  separation  of  a 
member with a diagnosed adjustment disorder to “condition, not a disability.”13  Mem-
bers discharged for this reason may receive either an RE-3G code, which permits them 
to reenlist if they can prove to a recruiter that they no longer have the condition (such as 
obesity or allergy) for which they were discharged, or an RE-4 code, which prohibits 
them from reenlisting in any military service.  The only disciplinary infraction commit-
ted  by  the  applicant  during  her  service  was  a  single  instance  of  underage  drinking.  
Therefore, the Board finds that the assignment of the RE-4 code is and would be unfair.  
However,  assigning  the  applicant  an  RE-3G  would  also  be  unfair  because  the  “con-
dition” that caused her discharge is quite unclear in her medical record and so it would 
be virtually impossible for her to prove that the “condition” had resolved.   

 
14. 

 
15. 

In light of the confusion of diagnoses that resulted in the applicant’s dis-
charge, the Board finds that the most accurate and just narrative reason for discharge in 
the SPD Handbook would be “separation for miscellaneous/general reasons.”  Under 
the handbook, members discharged for “miscellaneous/general reasons” receive either 
an RE-1 or an RE-4 reenlistment code.  As stated in finding 13, the assignment of the RE-
4 code would be unfair to the applicant.  Given that, by definition, adjustment disorders 
are not permanent,14 PTSD is not necessarily permanent,15 the applicant has been evalu-
ated  and  deemed  mentally  fit  for  military  service  by  a  clinical  psychologist,  and  the 
applicant will be required to reveal her medical history prior to reenlisting in any mili-
tary service, the Board finds that she should receive the RE-1 reenlistment code. 

The  applicant  alleged  that  her  rights  were  violated  in  the  course  of  the 
investigation of the assault on May 21, 2001.  Such a violation, if proven, would be rele-
vant to the removal of any documentation of non-judicial punishment or court-martial 
in her record.  However, because the charges were dismissed, there is no record of them 
in her record.  Moreover, the Board finds that the applicant has not proved any causal 
relationship between the alleged violation of her right to counsel and to remain silent by 
the official investigator and her command’s decision to discharge her.  The record indi-
cates  that  the  applicant’s  command  referred  her  for  psychological  evaluation  not 
because she was found to have drunk alcohol on May 21, 2001, but because of the appli-
cant’s  ongoing  psychiatric  symptoms  and  complaints.    The  applicant  alleged  that  her 

                                                 
13 CGBCMR Docket Nos. 2001-072, 199x-050. 
14 DSM-IV-TR, p. 679; Coast Guard Medical Manual, Chap. 3.F.16.d. 
15 DSM-IV-TR, p. 466. 

command violated her rights by using her counselor as an “investigatory agent.”  How-
ever,  members  of  the  military  do  not  enjoy  the  same  privileges  with  respect  to  their 
medical records as private citizens, and the Coast Guard is entitled to discharge mem-
bers on the basis of information in their medical records.  Moreover, the psychologist’s 
report indicates that the applicant was expressly warned about “the limits of confiden-
tiality” before he evaluated and diagnosed her.  

The applicant’s record does contain an administrative entry documenting 
her first “alcohol incident,” prepared in accordance with Article 20.B.2.g. of the Person-
nel Manual.  Such entries are made by a member’s CO upon his or her judgment that an 
“alcohol  incident,”  as  defined  in  Article  20.A.2.d.  of  the  Personnel  Manual,  occurred.  
No admission by the member or conviction at mast or court-martial is necessary for a 
CO to find that an “alcohol incident” has occurred.  Moreover, the applicant indicated 
in her application to this Board that she drank beer on the night of May 21, 2001, while 
underage.  Therefore, the Board finds that she has not proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence that her CO committed any error or injustice in determining that an “alcohol 
incident” occurred and in documenting it in a page 7 in her record. 

The applicant’s official military record, as submitted to the Board by the 
Coast  Guard,  does  not  contain  the  other  page  7s  that  she  allegedly  received  for  not 
saluting during flag lowering, having a cell phone at work, and hanging up on a petty 
officer.  Even assuming they still exist but are misplaced, she has not presented any evi-
dence apart from her own allegations to prove that the information on the page 7s is 
erroneous or unfair.  Therefore, the Board finds that it need take no action with respect 
to these alleged records. 

 
 
18.  Accordingly, partial relief should be granted by correcting the applicant’s 
DD 214 to show that she was discharged for “miscellaneous/general reasons” with a 
JND separation code and an RE-1 reenlistment code. 
 
 

 
16. 

 
17. 

ORDER 

 

The application of xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USCG, for correction of her 

military record is granted as follows: 
 
 
Her DD 214 and other records shall be corrected to show that she was discharged 
for “miscellaneous/general reasons” with a JND separation code and an RE-1 reenlist-
ment code.  The separation authority shall be Article 12-B-12 instead of Article 12-B-16.   
 

The Coast Guard shall issue her a new DD 214 showing these corrections, rather 
than issuing the corrections on a DD 215.  No copy of this final decision shall be kept in 
the applicant’s military record. 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 
Barbara Betsock 

 

 
 

 
Charles Medalen 

(see * below)  
 
Thomas A. Phemister 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* This member was unavailable to sign this order page when the final corrections were 
made.  However, he fully participated in the deliberations of the Board and concurred 
in this Final Decision and order.